| * I am indebted to Mauro Barberis, Juan Carlos Bayón,
Bruno Celano, Pierluigi Chiassoni, Paolo Comanducci, Riccardo Guastini, Pablo Navarro and Cristina Redondo for
many valuable suggestions on a draft of this paper. This paper integrates into a project research financed by the
Ministerio de Educación y Cultura de España (PB98-1061-C02-02) and it was written in the Dipartimento
di Cultura Giuridica 'Giovanni Tarello' (University of Genoa) in a stay of research also financed by the same institution
(PR 2000-0078). A previous version of this essay has been presented to IVR - International Congress: "The
Legal Ought" Genova, 19-20/6/2000 and will be published in P. Chiassoni (ed.), The Legal Ought. Proceedings
of the IVR Mid-Term Congress in Genoa, Torino, Giappichelli, 2001. ** Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona, Spain) 1- This title evokes Stephen R. Perry, 'The Varieties of Legal Positivism' in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 9 (1996) 361-395, but it does not mean an identification with the content of this paper. 2- Vd., e.g., Norberto Bobbio, Giusnaturalismo e positivismo giuridico, (Milano: Ed. di Comunità, 1965) and H.L.A. Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals' [1958] in H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 21-48. 3- For a perspicous presentation of the features which define the constitutionalism, see Riccardo Guastini, 'La "costituzionalizzazione" dell'ordinamento italiano' in Ragion Pratica, 11 (1998), pp185-206. Also Joseph Raz 'On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries' in Larry Alexander (ed.), Constitutionalism. Philosophical Foundations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 152-157. 4- Vd., e.g., Gustavo Zagrebelsky, Il diritto mite. Legge, diritti, giustizia, (Torino: Einaudi, 1992). 5- Vd., e.g. Luigi Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale, (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1989) in where the changes are important, vd. also, Luis Prieto Sanchís, Constitucionalismo y positivismo, (México: Fontamara, 1997) and Giorgio Pino, 'The Place of Legal Positivism in Contemporary Constitutional States' in Law and Philosophy, 18 (1999), pp. 513-536. 6- Perhaps the place in which these theses are more clearly expressed is a paper published in Spanish (never published in English) by H.L.A. Hart, 'El nuevo desafío del positivismo jurídico', (Spanish Trans. F. Laporta, L. Hierro y J.R. de Páramo), in Sistema, 36 (1990, mayo), pp. 3-19, though relevant parts of this paper appear in the 'Postscript' to The Concept of Law, 2 ed. by P. Bulloch and J. Raz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 7- Some fundamental steps of this criticism are Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977); A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). 8- In the words of the major supporter of ELP, Joseph Raz: 'A jurisprudential theory is acceptable only if its tests for identifying the content of the law and determining its existence depend exclusively on facts of human behaviour capable of being described in value-neutral terms, and applied without resort to moral argument'. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 39-40. 9- J. L. Coleman has distinguished two forms of understanding the thesis II, one which presupposes the internal negation of the statement which affirms the relation between law and morality (ELP), and other which presupposes the external negation of that thesis (ILP): 'The two most plausible and distinct interpretations of the Separability Thesis can be expressed in terms of the difference between what in modal logic is called internal and external negation. On the internal negation formulation, the Separability Thesis is the claim that in all legal systems it is necessarily the case that the legality of a norm not depend on its morality or its substantive merits. On the external negation formulation, the Separability Thesis is the claim that it is not necessarily the case that in any legal system the legality of a norm depend on its morality or its substantive merits'. Jules L. Coleman, 'Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions' in Brian Bix (ed.), Analyzing Law. New Essays in Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 265). 10- Raz, e.g., asserts: 'There is yet a third way in which the sources thesis is responsible for legal gaps and it too arises out of conflict situations. The law may make certain legal rules have prima facie force only by subjecting them to moral or other non-source-based considerations. Let us assume, for example, that by law contracts are valid only if not immoral. Any particular contract can be judged to be prima facie valid if it conforms to the 'value-neutral' conditions for the validity of contract laid down by law. The proposition 'it is legally conclusive that this contract is valid' is neither true nor false until a court authoritatively determines its validty. This is a consequence of the fact that by the sources thesis the courts have discretion when required to apply moral considerations'. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (supra n. 8), p. 75. 11- The precedents of such conception can be found in Genaro R. Carrió (one of the first defenders of ILP, often ignored in the present debate), Principios jurídicos y positivismo jurídico (Buenos Aires: Abeledo- Perrot, 1971) and Dworkin y el positivismo jurídico, (México: UNAM, 1981); David Lyons, 'Principles, Positivism and Legal Theory' in Yale Law Journal, 87 (1977), 415-436, Philip Soper (1977), 'Legal Theory and Obligation of the Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute', in Michigan Law Review, 75 (1977),511-542. A more developed conception it can be found in a group of papers by Jules L. Coleman, 'Negative and Positive Positivism', Journal of Legal Studies, 11 (1982), 139-162, 'On the Relationship between Law and Morality', Ratio Iuris, 2 (1989), 66-78; 'Authority and Reason' in Robert P. George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.287-319; 'Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions' (supra n. 9) pp.258-278; 'Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis', Legal Theory, 4 (1998), 381-426 and in the book by W.J. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Perhaps, this is also the account (with the name of soft-positivism) of H.L.A. Hart, 'Postscript' in The Concept of Law, (supra n. 6), but see below, in 3. 12- In fact, it can be argued that, in all three versions, the first and the second theses have some conceptual relationship, in contrast the third thesis is, in my opinion, conceptually independent from the other two. 13- The distinction in these terms in Eugenio Bulygin: 'Time and Validity', in: A. A. Martino (ed.), Deontic Logic, Computational Linguistics and Legal Information Systems, (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1982), pp. 65-82, José Juan Moreso, Pablo Navarro, 'Applicabilità ed Efficacia delle norme giuridiche' in Paolo Comanducci, Riccardo Guastini (eds.), Struttura e Dinamica dei sistemi giuridici, Torino: Giappichelli, 1996, 15-36 and José Juan Moreso, Legal Indeterminacy and Constitutional Interpretation, trad. de Ruth Zimmerling, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), pp.105-115. 14- Jules L. Coleman, 'Incorporationism, Conventionalism, and the Practical Difference Thesis' (supra n. 11), pp. 404-405. The origin of this distinction in Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (supra n. 8), pp. 101-102, 119-120. Vd,. also W. J. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism, (supra n. 11), p. 157 , Jules L. Coleman, 'Second Thoughts and Other Personal Impressions', (supra nota 9) pp. 260-1, n. 19 y 263 n. 22; Scott J. Shapiro, 'On Hart's Way Out', Legal Theory, 4 (1998): 469-508, en p.506 y Matthew Kramer, 'How Moral Principles Can Enter into the Law', Legal Theory, 6 (2000), pp. 103-107. On the other hand, I am indebted to Mauro Barberis, who attracted my attention on an idea of an Italian legal thinker, Santi Romano (Frammenti di un dizionario giuridico, Milano, Giuffrè, 1947, pp. 74-5), according to which when legal norms resort to the moral standards, then we have 'un rinvio non ricettizio del diritto alla morale' (cfr. also Mauro Barberis, Filosofia del diritto (Bologna: Il Mulino), p. 207. 15- Jules L. Coleman, 'Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis' (supra n. 11), p. 410. 16- Vd. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (supra n. 6), 94. These are the words of Hart: 'The simplest form of remedy for the uncertainty of the regime of primary rule is the introduction of what we shall call a 'rule of recognition'. This will specify some feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts'. Vd; the criticism in this line by E. Mitrophanous: 'The first criticism of soft positivism is that its admission of moral criteria in the rule of recognition is inconsistent with the function of the law to identify with certainty the legal standards of the system'. Eleni Mitrophanous, 'Soft Positivism', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 17 (1997), p. 627. 17- Eleni Mitrophanous, 'Soft Positivism' (supra n. 16), pp.635-7; Philip Soper, 'Two Puzzles form the Postscript', Legal Theory, 3 (1998), p. 365; Susanna Pozzolo, 'Riflessioni su inclusive e soft positivism' in Paolo Comanducci and Riccardo Guastini (eds.), Analisi e Diritto 1998. Ricerche di giurisprudenza analitica, p. 240. 18- H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (supra n. 6), pp. 250-251. 19- Ibidem, p. 254. 20- Hart's answer has also been considered insufficient as a defense of soft postivism and has been argued that there are other alternatives. Vd., Kenneth Einar Himma, 'Incorporationism and the Objectivity of Moral Norms', Legal Theory, 5 (1999), 415-434 and Matthew Kramer, In Defense of Legal Positivism. Law without Trimmings, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 152-161. 21- In this point I will follow Bernard Williams's ideas, as they appear in ch. 8 of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, (London: Fontana Press, 1985); 'Ethics' in A. C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 546-582 and 'Truth en Ethics', Ratio 8 (1985), 227-242. 22- Vd., e.g., A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1936). Such a thesis depends on the absolute acceptation of the principle of verification. As Georg Henrik von Wright affirms (Norm and Action, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963, p. 104 note 1): 'Yet there was a time not long ago when it was seriously maintained in some philosophical circles that norm-formulations actually are 'meaningless' because removed from truth or falsehood. This illustrates the power of philosophical dogmas -in this case the so-called verificationist theory of meaning- of perverting the philosopher's use of language'. 23- Vd. Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong, London: Penguin, 1977. 24- Vd. Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, ch. 1. 25- Bernard Williams, Ethics and Limits of Philosophy, (supra n. 21), pp. 138-140. 26- Vd., e.g., John McDowell, 'Values and Secondary Qualities' in Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 110-129. 27- Vd. Bernard Williams, 'Ethics', (supra note 21), p. 558. 28- Vd., e.g., R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952) and recently, Sorting Out Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Other accounts near to the moral emotivism, but compatible with the objectivism are, e.g., Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) and Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 29- Vd., e.g., Paolo Comanducci, Razonamiento jurídico. Elementos para un modelo, (México: Fontamara, 1999), pp. 48-49. 30- Willard v. O. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in From a Logical Point of View, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 20-46. 31- Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, (supra note 21) , ch.. 8. Vd. also Joseph Raz, 'Notes on Value and Objectivity' in Engaging Reason. On the Theory of Value and Action, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 6. 32- Vd. Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, ch. 2. 33- Vd. Carlos E. Alchourrón y Eugenio Bulygin, 'Los límites de la lógica y el razonamiento jurídico', in Carlos E. Alchourrón y Eugenio Bulygin, Análisis lógico y Derecho, (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1991), pp. 315-316. 34- The locus classicus is W. B. Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts', Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955-6), 167-198. 35- Vd. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, (supra n.7), pp. 70-73. 36-Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law,(supra n. 8), p. 47 note 8. Vd. also Eleni Mitrophanous, 'Soft Positivism', (supra n. 16), p. 642. 37- A similar account in Timothy Endicott, 'Raz on Gaps -The Surprising Part', draft presented in University of Palermo (Italia), september 1999. 38- H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (supra n. 6), p. 244. 39- Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (supra n. 7), pp. 127-8. 40- Ibidem, pp. 126-7. N. Rescher asserts: 'At some point of abstraction there is always a seeming 'agreement'. I think p, you think q. It is then clear that both of us are logic-bound to endorse p-or-q. But this agreement surely cuts no ice for a serious consideration of matters of consensus regarding beliefs.' Nicholas Rescher, Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 44-45. Vd., also, Juan Carlos Bayón, 'Law, Conventionalism, and Controversy' en Jurisprudence on the Continent. Symposium on analytical jurisprudence, St. Catherine's College, Oxford, February 13, 1999. 41-Ronald Dworkin, Law 's Empire , (supra n. 7), pp. 65-66. 42- Ibidem p. 103. 43- Michael Moore, 'Methaphysics, Epistemology and Legal Theory', Southern California Law Review, 60 (1987), 453-506, p. 494. Vd., also, José Juan Moreso, Legal Indeterminacy and Constitutional Interpretation, (supra n. 13), pp. 145-147. 44- Moreover, it has been argued (with plausibility) that moral realism is compatible with moral indeterminacy. Vd., Russ Shafer-Landau, 'Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism and Moral Indeterminacy', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 (1994), 331-344 and 'Vagueness, Borderlines Cases and Moral Realism', American Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1995), 83-96. 45- Vd., e.g., Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, specially, chs.. 2-3 and 'Authority, Law, and Morality' in Ethics in the Public Domain, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 194-221. 46- 'Authority, Law, and Morality', (supra n. 45), p. 218. 47- Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, (supra n. 8), chs. 12-13. 48- Even though Hart follows the Raz's analysis of exclusionary reasons, in H.L.A. Hart, 'Commands and Auhoritative Legal Reasons' in Essays on Bentham, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982), ch. X, Hart rejects the idea that legal authorities necessarily claim moral legitimacy. Vd. also Matthew Kramer, In Defense of Legal Positivism, (supra n.20), ch. 4: 'Requirements, Reasons, and Raz: Legal Positivism and Legal Duties'. 49- Vd., also, 'Authority, Law, and Morality', (supra n. 45), pp. 196-7. 50- Some doubts about the use of the arbitror's example in order to take the central features of legal authorities into account have been put forward also in Yasutomo Morigiwa, 'Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory' en Southern California Law Review, 62 (1989): 897-913, in p. 901 and W.J. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism, (supra n. 11), p. 132. A defense of Raz' account in Tim Dare, 'Wilfrid Waluchow and the Argument from Authority' Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 17 (1997):347-366, in 356-359 and a reply of W.J. Waluchow in 'Authority and the Practical Difference Thesis: A defense of Inclusive Legal Positivism' Legal Theory 6 (2000), 45-81. Even if I share some of Waluchow's arguments I will not insist in his idea that there are other functions which the arbitror's decisions can meet, apart solving disputes, and in these cases she could resort to the dependent reasons. Here I do not follow either one of the paths suggested by Coleman, according to it is necessary to distinguish two functions in the rule of recognition: validation function and epistemic function. According to Coleman, if the rule of recognition had as function tthe identification of the content of legal norms, then it should be governed by the doctrine of authority, but for Coleman the rule of recognition can have only a validation function. In my view, however, the rule of recognition is a rule which allows us to identify the valid norms in a legal system. Vd., Jules L. Coleman, 'Authority and Reason' (supra n.11), pp. 287-319; 'Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions' (supra n. 9) pp.258-278; 'Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis', (supra n. 11), pp. 381-426 51- Vd. in this line the reflections of Francisco Laporta in Entre el Derecho y la moral, México: Fontamara, 1993, pp. 60-63. 52- The Morality of Freedom, (supra n. 45), pp. 43-52. 53- Vd., por ejemplo, Joseph Raz, 'Postema on Law's Autonomy and Public Practical Reasons: A Critical Comment' Legal Theory, 4 (1998), 1-20 and 'On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning' in Ethics in the Public Domain, (supra n. 45), pp. 310-324. 54- Vd. Fernando Atria, 'Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited' Law and Philosophy, 18 (1999), 537-577 and Juan Carlos Bayón, 'Law, Conventionalism, and Controversy', (supra n. 40). 55- A suggestive conception which follows this distinction in M. Cristina Redondo, 'Reglas "genuinas" y positivismo jurídico' in Paolo Comanducci and Riccardo Guastini (eds.), Analisi e Diritto 1998. Ricerche di giurisprudenza analitica, pp. 243-276. 56- Vd. Raz's relevant reflections on the scope of the exclusionary reasons ('It should be remembered that exclusionary reasons may vary in scope; they may exclude all or only some of the reasons which apply to certain practical problems' in Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 19912), pp. 40. 57- Vd. W.J. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (supra n. 11), pp. 129-140 and Stephen Perry, 'Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common law' Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7 (1987), pp. 222-3, 241-2. 58- Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, (supra n. 6), pp. 429-30, nota 3. 59- John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 195-201. 60- Jules L. Coleman, 'Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis' (supra n. 11), p. 382-383. 61- Scott J. Shapiro, 'On Hart's Way Out' en Legal Theory, 4 (1998), 469-508 and 'The Difference That Rules Make' en Brian Bix (ed.), Analyzing Law. New Essays in Legal Theory, (supra n.9), pp. 33-64. The thesis, though recent, has produced a wide discussion, vd. Jules L. Coleman, 'Incorporationism, Conventionalism, and the Practical Difference Thesis' (supra n. 11), pp. 381-422; Kenneth Einar Himma, 'Waluchow's Defense of Inclusive Positivism' Legal Theory, 5 (1999), 101-116 and 'H.L.A. Hart and the Practical Difference Thesis', Legal Theory, 6 (2000), 1-43; W. J. Waluchow, 'Authority and the Practical Difference Thesis: A Defense of Inclusive Legal Positivism' (supra n. 50), 45-81 and Matthew Kramer, 'How Moral Principles Can Enter into the Law', (supra n. 14), 103-107. 62-For a similar argument on the superfluousness of the law, vd. Carlos S. Nino, The Ethics of Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), Appendix vi, pp. 394-5. 63- Scott J. Shapiro, 'On Hart's Way Out', (supra n. 61), p. 496. 64- Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, (supra n. 8), ch. 6. 65- W. J. Waluchow, 'Authority and the Practical Difference Thesis: A Defense of Inclusive Legal Positivism' (supra n. 50), p. 76. 66- Scott J. Shapiro, 'On Hart's Way Out' en Legal Theory, (supra n. 61), pp. 500-503, vd. also Kenneth Einar Himma, 'H.L.A. Hart and the Practical Difference Thesis' (supra n. 61), pp. 2-4; W. J. Waluchow, 'Authority and the Practical Difference Thesis: A Defense of Inclusive Legal Positivism' (supra n. 50), pp. 78-79 y Matthew Kramer, 'How Moral Principles Can Enter into the Law', (supra n. 14), pp. 92-93. 67- Vd., Scott J. Shapiro, 'The Difference That Rules Make' (supra n. 61), p. 59. Vd. also Juan Carlos Bayón, 'Law, Conventionalism, and Controversy' (supra n. 40). 68- Vd. this argument attributed to Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush, (New York: Ocreana, 1930), pp. 72-76) by Brian Leiter, 'Legal Indeterminacy' en Legal Theory, 1 (1995), p. 483 and vd. similars consequences of the sceptical ideas on the identification of legal norms in Tecla Mazzarese: '"Norm Proposition": Epistemic and Semantic Queries', Rechtstheorie, 22 (1991), 39-70, Riccardo Guastini, Distinguendo. Studi di teoria e metateoria del diritto, (Torino: Giappichelli, 1996), pp. 165-172 y 173-191 and Pierluigi Chiassoni, 'Interpretative Games. Statutory Construction Through Gricean Eyes' in Paolo Comanducci and Riccardo Guastini (eds.), Analisi e Diritto 1999. Ricerche di giurisprudenza analitica, pp. 79-99. |